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Seigniorage  from required  reserves  is shown  to lead to lower capital
accumulation  than  a tax on investrnent  raising the same  rcvenue.  The result
is obtained  in an infinitely lived representative  agent  model  to avoid  the
intergenerational  wealth Eansfers  found in Freeman's  (1987) study of
seigniorage  from required  resewes  in an  overlapping  generations  economy.
I have  benefited  from conversations  with Joseph  Haslag  and  Gregory  Huffman. The views
expressed  are  not necessarily  those  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve  System.Expansion  of the fiat money  stock  taxes  fiat money  balances  held  by the public.
Black  (1970),  Fama  (1980),  Calvo  and  Femandez  (1983),  and  Romer  (1985)  have  all
noted  that  r€quiring  banks  to hold reserves  offiat rnoney  then  functions  as  a tax on
banking.  Freeman  (1987),  using  an  overlapping  generations  model,  demonstrated  that the
tax on banking  implied by required  reserves  and  a finite rate  of money  expansion  leads  to
lower holdings  of capital  and  lower steady-state  welfare  than  would a direct  tax on banking
yielding the same  revenue.
Replacing  reserve-requirement  seigniorage  widr a dir€ct  tax on barking in an
overlapping  generations  model  hura the  initial generation  by rendering  wonhless  its initial
holding  of fiat money.  This intergenerational  Eansfer  of wealth  makes  welfare  comparisons
diffrcult to interpreLl  To avoid  intergenerational  wealth  transfers  this paper  takes  up the
optimality of resewe  requiremens  in an  infinitely lived representative  agent  framework.
Seigniorage  from required  reserves  is shown  unambiguously  to generate  lower steady-state
capital  and  welfare  than  a  direct tax on banking.
The  model: There  exists  a  continuum  of infinitely  lived agents  whose  population
is normalized  to 1.  Each  has  preferences  over  consumption  at date  r>1 described  by the
function  Z  P ,kr).  The  function  u(c) is increasing,  concave,  and  twice-continuously
,=o
differentiable  wift  lim6--e6u(c)  = ...
The  economy's  sole  good  can  be  consumed  or made  into capital  that  lasts  a single
period.  If t1 goods  are  made  into capital  at t, flft)  goods  will be produced  at t+1. The
lAn altemative  approach,  taken  by Bacchetta  and  Caminal  (1990),  retains  the ovedapping  genrations  mode!
and  requires  the govemmcnt  to fund intergeneradonal  transfers  o the initial old with distortionary  Exation.production  function/(&) is increasing,  concave,  and  twice-continuously  differentiable  with
lim*-+of(k) = o".  In the initial period  each  agent  starts  with/(ko) goods.
In the  initial period  the agent  also  owns  Mg unis of fiat money.  The nominal  stock
of fiat money  in any  period  ris Mr, which  is expanded  at  a  constanttate  z> I' implyng
lhzt  Mt= zMrt.Fiat  money  is held to satisfy  a legal  requirement  that  an agent  owning tl
units of capital  at t must also  hold fiat money  balances  worth {k1  goods'  The goods  value
of a unit of fiat money  at r will be  denoted  v1  and  an agent's  nominal  demand  for fiat money
balances  at r will be denoted  m1.  The seigniorage  from the expansion  of the  fiat money
stock  is used  o help finance  a fixed level of wasteful  govemnrent  expendiffes g. The
govemment's  only rwenue alternative  is a tax  collecting q goods  for each  good  made  into
capial at r. Like seigniorage,  this tax is a distorting  tax tlnt discourages  investrnenL
Because  it does  not  tax  existing  capital,  it introduces  no time-consistency  issues.
(fo  keep  the analysis  as straighdorward  as  possible,  I have  assumed  drat  the
rcserve  requfuement  and  invesunent  tax are  applied  to all capital.  The  real world case  of
reserve  requirements  imposed  only on some  foms of intemrediated  capital  is a trivial
extension  of this  analysis.)
Equitibrium: Equilibrium  is defined  to be  a sequence  lq,k)for  t2l  and  given
valdes  of g, z, t, and  @  such  that  each  agent  maximizes  his utility subject  to his budget
constraints  and  the  reserve  requirement,  taking  as  given  the  price sequence  [v1J;  each  agent
has  perfect  foresighq  the market  for frat money  clean; and  the government  budget
constraint  is met  with equality.
An individual's  budget  constraint  in each  period  r )l  is
f(k1-)+v2m2-1=ct*kt+v{4+rtkt,  (l)
which with the legal  requiremen  t v  lU  = @*1  can  be written
.(&r-t)+ (vlvriQktt=ct  -t'  kt +  Sfu +  tftj  .  A)
The  resulting  first order  condition  for the  maximization  of utility by an  individual isu'(c,)  _  (vlvri0  +f(kt)
Bu'(c*t)  I  +  O  +  11 
(3)
The  clearing  of the  market  for fiat money  requires  that
vtMt  =  Qh  (4)
which in a steady  state  (&,  = &  for t ) 0) implies  that
Yt+l  -  !  ttl vt  z
The govemment's  budget  constraint  in period  r is
't1k1  +  v[M1 -My1l
=  ttkr +  vMtll-Uzl
=  7&t  + $fulr-Llzl  (6)
Compartng steaily states: To compare  investment  taxation to seignioragc  from
reserves  let us examine  the steady-states  of two benchmart  policies.  First suppose  that
there  is no reserve  requirement  (@  = 0) so  ttrat  all revenue  comes  from investnent taxation'
The steady-state  first-order  condition  simplifies  to
!  _  "f(/c)  (7)
p  - 
l+t
When  the govemment  budget  constraint  (6) is also  included,  we find
I  -  f(k)
B 
-  r+stk 
(8)
Now suppose  that  all revenue  somes  from seigniorage  (t=  0).The steady-state
equilibrium  conditions  now simplify to
I  -  0/z+f'(k)
P 
-  r+o 
(e)
where the government budget constraint (6) implies that the reserve  requirement be such
that
^=  I  (ro) v  - 
1t-t1z1kNotice  from (9) and  (10) that  for any  finite rate  of fiat money  creation,  seigniorage
from required  reserves  is not equivalent  to investrnent  taxation.  Solving (10) for 1/z  and
substituting  the  expression  into  (9)  we  find
Q  -stk  +f'(k)
(11)
r+O
Comparing  (8)  with (ll)  [ and  noting  from (6) that  Q> glk], we  see  that  the  steady-state
marginal  product  of capital  is greater  with required  rpserves,  implyrng a lower steady-state
capial stock  for any  given  revenue.  Notice that  even  when  there  is no seigniorage[  z = I
and  g= 91,  a reserve  requirernent  lowers  steady-state  capital.  By requiring  investors  to hold
unprrductive  reserves  of fiat money  in order  to invest,  a reserve  requirement  discourages
investrnent  even  more  than  does  a direct  tax on investrnenL  To understand  this, combine




|  (z  - r)k + "f'(e)
B-  r*  8 -  (1  - llz)k
(12)
As z increases  (and  @  decreases)  the steady-state  marginal  product  of capital  decreases  and
steady-state  capital  increases.  As z goes  to infinity, the  equilibrium  condition  approaches
that  of a tax on investrnent.  The  larger  is z,  the more  that  a given  level of rcserves  is taxed
and  the less  that it is used  for saving,  This reveals  that  the social  cost  of a reserve
requircment  comes  from those  rcserves  that  are  held  but not taxed  away.
The  welfare  implications  of reserve  requirements  follow direcdy  from the  steady-
state  analysis.  In a steady-state  with positive  resewe  requircments,  the marginal  product  of
capital  exceeds  the  marginal  rate  of subsritution.  Therefore,  a policy that  increases  the  stock
of capital  in every  period  while raising  the same  revenue  increases  welfare.References
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